FAA Issues New Guidance to Preserve Cockpit Voice Recorder Data After Incidents
The FAA is developing recommendations to protect information captured by the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) of an aircraft that has been involved in an accident or reportable incident. The agency has issued a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) advising airline crews and maintenance teams to shut off power to the CVR to protect critical audio data after a reportable event. CVRs are designed with a finite amount of memory that is overwritten, unless the circuit breaker for the device is pulled. The SAFO advises operators to provide clear shutoff instructions for the CVR through flight, maintenance, and dispatch manuals, and instructs airlines and air taxi companies to assess applicable procedures through their Safety Management Systems (SMS) to ensure the guidance is implemented and effective. READ MORE: NTSB Releases Final Report on Alaska Door Plug Failure READ MORE: 4 Flight Attendants Sue Boeing Over Alaska Door Plug Blowout According to the FAA, the SAFO addresses a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendation in 2025 stemming from the January 2024 in-flight loss of a door plug from Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, a Boeing 737-900. The mid-exit door plug (MED) departed the aircraft shortly after takeoff from Portland International Airport (KPDX) in Oregon. The loss of the MED as the jet climbed through 14,830 feet resulted in explosive decompression. The door, along with unsecured objects including cellphones, paper, children's toys, clothing, and parts of the aircraft interior rained down on a Portland suburb. One flight attendant and seven passengers received minor injuries. The captain, first officer, three flight attendants, and 164 passengers were uninjured. Video taken from inside the aircraft during the return to KPDX appeared on social media, showing supplemental oxygen masks hanging from the ceiling, seat frames twisted as if they were made of Play-Doh, and a gaping hole in the fuselage with the city lights of Portland below. The aircraft was able to land safely at the airport, where the passengers and crew departed. Mid-exit door (MED) plug from Alaska Airlines Flight 1282. [Credit: NTSB] During the preliminary NTSB hearing it was learned that the force of the decompression blew open the cockpit door and the flight crew lost their headsets. The loss of cabin pressure necessitated the use of supplemental oxygen, which further made it difficult for the crew to communicate. In addition, the interphone was knocked out, making it impossible to reach the flight attendants in the cabin to determine the extent of the severity of the event. The CVR was not available for review by the NTSB, because, as noted by several people during testimony, by the time the technicians returned to the cockpit, the CVR had overwritten itself as it is designed to record two hours at a time, then recycle. The procedure in the event of an accident or incident is to pull the circuit breaker to preserve the information on the CVR, but it was noted that the flight crew was focused on the welfare of the passengers and getting the aircraft safely back on the ground. As the FAA report indicates, because the CVR had been overwritten, the NTSB was not able to fully evaluate some flight deck environment events associated with the rapid depressurization, such as the difficulties the pilots had establishing communications back to their headsets after removing oxygen masks. Because of the missing CVR, the NTSB could not determine whether factors other than the loud noises in the airplane contributed to the reported communication difficulties that occurred while the pilots were wearing their oxygen masks, such as the captain and a flight attendant reporting inability to communicate with each other over the interphone despite multiple attempts. "Such a determination would support the development of recommendations for safety enhancements, which, depending on the reason for the difficulties, could involve equipment, procedural, or training solutions," the FAA report stated. One of the recommendations to come out of the NTSB investigation was to require CVRs capable of recording 25 hours at a stretch before the overwrite. The FAA recommends that each operator with a CVR installed "confirm that company manuals contain instructions that the CVR circuit breaker be pulled after a reportable event. The instruction that the CVR circuit breaker is pulled could be included in flight operation manuals, maintenance manuals, and dispatch manuals, increasing the likelihood that the task is accomplished. Certificate holders operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 121 or 135 should use their safety assurance processes within their Safety Management System (SMS) to ensure the recommended risk controls are analyzed and assessed to meet the organization's safety objective." In an email to the FAA, the NTSB noted that following the accident Alaska Airlines implemented several changes related to preserving flight data recorder (FDR) and CVR data after an incident or accident, such as adding circuit breaker information to the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) used by pilots, and adding a reminder to the flight operations duty officer and dispatch brief checklists to confirm that CVR and FDR circuit breakers are pulled following an event. The airlines also revised the Emergency Coordination Center maintenance and engineering checklist, non-Emergency Coordination Center maintenance control checklist, and Emergency Coordination Center flight operations checklist to prioritize timely pulling of the FDR and CVR circuit breakers following an event. "The FAA recognizes the importance of protecting cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data following a reportable event," said FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford in an email to the NTSB. "There are several 14 CFR sections, §§ 121.135, 125.73, 135.23, and 91.1025, that stipulate manual content requirements. However, none of these sections require operators to ensure the cockpit voice recorders (CVR) circuit breaker has been pulled after a reportable event." Bedford's email continues, noting that after May 28, 2027, "every Part 121 and Part 135 certificate holder is required under 14 CFR Part 5 to have a Safety Assurance module within their Safety Management System which will require them to consider notifications from external sources and, therefore, use their safety assurance module to determine if they have procedures in place to ensure that CVR data retention is located throughout their manual system."