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Trump Flies Older Air Force One to U.K., Sidelines New VC-25B Bridge Aircraft Temporarily
President Trump traveled from Turkey to the U.K. aboard an older Air Force One aircraft, delaying use of the newer VC-25B Bridge jet donated by Qatar amid ongoing retrofit concerns.
The gist
Trump chooses older Air Force One for U.K. trip, putting new VC-25B Bridge plane retrofit under renewed scrutiny.
Continuing coverage
All Presidential Aircraft →President Donald Trump opted to travel from Turkey to the U.K. aboard an older Boeing 747 Air Force One variant, postponing the use of the newer VC-25B 'Bridge' aircraft on this leg of his trip. The Bridge jet, donated by the Qatari government last year and recently modified for presidential use, had made its maiden flight with Trump aboard earlier in July. Trump announced on his Truth Social platform that the decision was a nod to tradition and to offer U.S. service members in the U.K. a chance to tour the new aircraft at Mildenhall Air Force Base.
The trip from Turkey, where Trump attended a NATO summit, to the U.K.’s RAF Mildenhall was described by him as a short journey intended to give military personnel an inaugural viewing of the Bridge aircraft. Earlier in June, senior White House officials paid tribute to the aging VC-25A aircraft still in service, suggesting their operational end was near while also affirming their continued role in the presidential fleet.
The Bridge jet achieved a series of milestones recently including its first international flight coinciding with Trump’s diplomatic visit to Turkey, and a prior domestic flight from Andrews Joint Base, Maryland to Medora, North Dakota. Just days before the U.S. 250th anniversary, it participated in a patriotic flyover above the National Mall, marking its ceremonial debut.
Development of the VC-25B Bridge aircraft has been fraught with delays since Boeing began work in 2015 to replace the four-decade-old VC-25A Air Force One planes. The Pentagon now projects delivery by mid-2028, well behind schedule. Notably, Boeing’s spending on this program has surpassed $5 billion, exceeding the original $3.9 billion fixed-price contract by a significant margin.
In response to delays with the Boeing program, Trump endorsed using the gifted Qatari jet as a temporary presidential transport. The aircraft, built in 2013 for Qatar’s royal family, boasts a larger frame than past Air Force One planes, with a valuation around $400 million. The U.S. Air Force announced that L3Harris is handling its extensive modifications, which are estimated to cost an additional $400 million.
However, some lawmakers and aviation experts contend that total retrofitting costs could exceed $1 billion and extend timelines considerably. Congressional members on the Senate Appropriations Committee have challenged the hurried retrofit process and the lack of cost transparency, expressing concern that expedited work might compromise security, safety, or mission capabilities.
The retrofit has entailed dismantling and reassembling the plane to verify structural integrity, installing advanced secure communication systems including SpaceX Starlink, cyber defenses, anti-missile technology, and enabling in-flight refueling. Despite these upgrades, interior design changes remain minimal due to the tight schedule, maintaining much of the aircraft’s prior configuration from its Qatari service.
The Bridge’s patriotic livery departs from traditional blue hues, instead featuring a bold red, white, and blue paint scheme. Trump highlighted the aircraft’s uniqueness during his initial flight aboard it last week.
In late July, the Senate committee pressed both Air Force Secretary Troy Meink and L3Harris executives for detailed responses about the program’s costs, scope, and security implications, seeking a classified briefing by early August. This scrutiny underscores the challenges balancing rapid retrofitting with stringent national security requirements for such a critical presidential asset.
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All Aviation Safety →
Pilot's personal motives confirmed in Beijing Aurora SA60L crash into CITIC Tower
Chinese officials said a light aircraft that crashed into a high-rise building in Beijing was caused by the pilot's "personal reasons" and that he wrote before the crash of ending his life. The aircraft struck a high-rise building in Beijing's Chaoyang district at about 17:55 local time on June 26, 2026, killing the pilot, the sole occupant aboard the aircraft, and injuring 13 people on the ground, according to official statements. The single-engine, two-seat light sport aircraft was identified as an Aurora SA60L. Authorities imposed a nationwide light-aircraft flight ban after the crash. The building was the CITIC Tower, also known as China Zun, Beijing's tallest skyscraper. Beijing officials identified the pilot only by his surname, Liu, and said he was a 66-year-old Beijing resident who lived alone. Officials said Liu had suffered long-term insomnia and anxiety, and that his diary contained repeated references to suicide. The district said the 13 injured people were not in life-threatening condition after treatment. Videos circulating after the crash showed debris falling near the tower after the aircraft struck the building.

Wreckage of K2 Airways Boeing 737-400 Freighter Found in Arabian Sea After Disappearance
Search teams have recovered wreckage from a K2 Airways Boeing 737 freighter that disappeared over the Arabian Sea while flying from Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan. The Pakistan Airports Authority said the wreckage was found 53 nautical miles south of Ormara after a 12-hour search and rescue operation involving the Pakistan Navy and Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. The five crew members on board remained missing. K2 Airways said the aircraft was operating from Sharjah International Airport to Jinnah International Airport when it lost contact with air traffic control at about 21:21 local time on July 7, 2026. The airline identified the aircraft as a Boeing 737-400 freighter, registration AP-BOI. According to the Pakistan Airports Authority, the crew reported a navigation system issue at about 21:18 local time while en route to Karachi. About three minutes later, radar showed the aircraft rapidly descending and making a sharp heading change. Radar and radio contact were then lost approximately 155 nautical miles west of Karachi. The Pakistan Airports Authority activated a rescue coordination center and launched a multi-agency search at sea. K2 Airways said five people were on board: the captain, first officer, load master and two engineers. The airline said it was working with Pakistan's aviation authorities and other government agencies as the search continued. "We continue to pray earnestly for the safety of our colleagues," K2 Airways said in a statement. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif directed authorities to use all available resources in the search and rescue effort, according to Pakistani government statements. Search crews have recovered debris from the aircraft, but authorities have not announced the recovery of any of the main wreckage or the flight recorders. The water near the suspected crash area is about 3,000 meters deep, and officials have cautioned that floating debris may not mark the exact impact location because currents, wind and waves can move wreckage after a crash. The cause of the crash has not been determined. Flight-tracking data reviewed after the aircraft disappeared showed large altitude changes before the final loss of contact. The aircraft was a 27-year-old Boeing 737-400 converted to freighter duty. The 737-400 is part of Boeing's classic 737 family and is two generations older than the 737 MAX. K2 Airways is a Karachi-based private cargo airline. The aircraft involved in the crash was reported to be the carrier's only aircraft.

FAA Issues New Guidance to Preserve Cockpit Voice Recorder Data After Incidents
The FAA is developing recommendations to protect information captured by the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) of an aircraft that has been involved in an accident or reportable incident. The agency has issued a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) advising airline crews and maintenance teams to shut off power to the CVR to protect critical audio data after a reportable event. CVRs are designed with a finite amount of memory that is overwritten, unless the circuit breaker for the device is pulled. The SAFO advises operators to provide clear shutoff instructions for the CVR through flight, maintenance, and dispatch manuals, and instructs airlines and air taxi companies to assess applicable procedures through their Safety Management Systems (SMS) to ensure the guidance is implemented and effective. READ MORE: NTSB Releases Final Report on Alaska Door Plug Failure READ MORE: 4 Flight Attendants Sue Boeing Over Alaska Door Plug Blowout According to the FAA, the SAFO addresses a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendation in 2025 stemming from the January 2024 in-flight loss of a door plug from Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, a Boeing 737-900. The mid-exit door plug (MED) departed the aircraft shortly after takeoff from Portland International Airport (KPDX) in Oregon. The loss of the MED as the jet climbed through 14,830 feet resulted in explosive decompression. The door, along with unsecured objects including cellphones, paper, children's toys, clothing, and parts of the aircraft interior rained down on a Portland suburb. One flight attendant and seven passengers received minor injuries. The captain, first officer, three flight attendants, and 164 passengers were uninjured. Video taken from inside the aircraft during the return to KPDX appeared on social media, showing supplemental oxygen masks hanging from the ceiling, seat frames twisted as if they were made of Play-Doh, and a gaping hole in the fuselage with the city lights of Portland below. The aircraft was able to land safely at the airport, where the passengers and crew departed. Mid-exit door (MED) plug from Alaska Airlines Flight 1282. [Credit: NTSB] During the preliminary NTSB hearing it was learned that the force of the decompression blew open the cockpit door and the flight crew lost their headsets. The loss of cabin pressure necessitated the use of supplemental oxygen, which further made it difficult for the crew to communicate. In addition, the interphone was knocked out, making it impossible to reach the flight attendants in the cabin to determine the extent of the severity of the event. The CVR was not available for review by the NTSB, because, as noted by several people during testimony, by the time the technicians returned to the cockpit, the CVR had overwritten itself as it is designed to record two hours at a time, then recycle. The procedure in the event of an accident or incident is to pull the circuit breaker to preserve the information on the CVR, but it was noted that the flight crew was focused on the welfare of the passengers and getting the aircraft safely back on the ground. As the FAA report indicates, because the CVR had been overwritten, the NTSB was not able to fully evaluate some flight deck environment events associated with the rapid depressurization, such as the difficulties the pilots had establishing communications back to their headsets after removing oxygen masks. Because of the missing CVR, the NTSB could not determine whether factors other than the loud noises in the airplane contributed to the reported communication difficulties that occurred while the pilots were wearing their oxygen masks, such as the captain and a flight attendant reporting inability to communicate with each other over the interphone despite multiple attempts. "Such a determination would support the development of recommendations for safety enhancements, which, depending on the reason for the difficulties, could involve equipment, procedural, or training solutions," the FAA report stated. One of the recommendations to come out of the NTSB investigation was to require CVRs capable of recording 25 hours at a stretch before the overwrite. The FAA recommends that each operator with a CVR installed "confirm that company manuals contain instructions that the CVR circuit breaker be pulled after a reportable event. The instruction that the CVR circuit breaker is pulled could be included in flight operation manuals, maintenance manuals, and dispatch manuals, increasing the likelihood that the task is accomplished. Certificate holders operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 121 or 135 should use their safety assurance processes within their Safety Management System (SMS) to ensure the recommended risk controls are analyzed and assessed to meet the organization's safety objective." In an email to the FAA, the NTSB noted that following the accident Alaska Airlines implemented several changes related to preserving flight data recorder (FDR) and CVR data after an incident or accident, such as adding circuit breaker information to the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) used by pilots, and adding a reminder to the flight operations duty officer and dispatch brief checklists to confirm that CVR and FDR circuit breakers are pulled following an event. The airlines also revised the Emergency Coordination Center maintenance and engineering checklist, non-Emergency Coordination Center maintenance control checklist, and Emergency Coordination Center flight operations checklist to prioritize timely pulling of the FDR and CVR circuit breakers following an event. "The FAA recognizes the importance of protecting cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data following a reportable event," said FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford in an email to the NTSB. "There are several 14 CFR sections, §§ 121.135, 125.73, 135.23, and 91.1025, that stipulate manual content requirements. However, none of these sections require operators to ensure the cockpit voice recorders (CVR) circuit breaker has been pulled after a reportable event." Bedford's email continues, noting that after May 28, 2027, "every Part 121 and Part 135 certificate holder is required under 14 CFR Part 5 to have a Safety Assurance module within their Safety Management System which will require them to consider notifications from external sources and, therefore, use their safety assurance module to determine if they have procedures in place to ensure that CVR data retention is located throughout their manual system."

Royal Jordanian Crew Member and Bus Driver Killed in Queens Crash After JFK Arrival
The chartered bus was carrying crew from a flight that had arrived at JFK from Amman.
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